Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 by Phyllis R. Parker

Author:Phyllis R. Parker
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: -
Publisher: University of Texas Press
Published: 2014-07-15T16:00:00+00:00

U.S. Activities

Communications Stepped Up

As developments in Brazil reached a crisis, the Americans stepped up the efficiency of their communications. A teletype machine, set up in the embassy during the week after Gordon returned from Washington, remained in operation through part of the first week in April, with exchanges between the State Department and the Rio embassy usually scheduled at least twice daily.237 On the afternoon of March 30, Secretary Rusk instructed the U.S. embassy in Brazil to expedite dissemination of information by including the White House, the office of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander in chief of the southern command, and the CIA as recipients of “all important telegrams dealing with substantive matters.”238 Washington took a further lead. A cable that evening from Secretary Rusk (drafted by Burton and approved by Mann) instructed all U.S. consulates in Brazil to be on a twenty-four-hour alert and to report directly to Washington “any significant developments involving military or political resistance to the Goulart regime.”239 Ambassador Gordon canceled a trip to Alagoas at the suggestion of Vernon Walters who was convinced the coup would begin on the thirty-first.240

On the evening of March 30, Niles Bond, consul general in São Paulo, cabled Washington that “two sources active in [the] anti-Goulart movement say that [the] coup against GOB [government of Brazil] should come within forty-eight hours.” Bond was not convinced about the forty-eight—hour timetable but believed that the opposition to Goulart was taking the offensive. Bond added an important message: these two unnamed principal conspirators had inquired for the first time “whether [the] American fleet can reach Southern Brazil fast.”241

On the evening of March 30, the Associated Press released a House Foreign Affairs Committee Report dealing with “Winning the Cold War.” The story, while reporting criticism of Goulart’s tolerance of communism, quoted the report as saying that “despite [the] critical situation [in] Brazil, there is little prospect for [a] communist takeover there in the foreseeable future.” Concerned about the timing of positive statements about Goulart just as the United States was committing itself to his overthrow, Secretary Rusk gave a special briefing to reporters to explain that the report had been prepared in January and that Brazil was “increasingly subject to communist influence,” much to the dismay of the United States. The briefing statements were reported along with the story.242 Gordon was pleased and felt it was timely for the United States to make “some public expression of interest and concern.”243

At 11:30 A.M. on March 31 in Washington, a meeting was held attended by Secretary Rusk and other State Department representatives, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Commander in Chief of Southern Forces (USCINCSO) Lt. Gen. Andrew P. O’Meara, CIA Director John McCone, and other top officials. At the meeting there were briefings on the military situation in Brazil and on U.S. naval and air support capabilities. The group considered what political actions should be taken (such as consultation with

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